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Abstract: This article aims to assess the impact of the EU-Mercosur Agreement on the Brazilian 
economy using the Computable General Model (CGE) Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). The 
study proposes two sets of simulations – one with the United Kingdom as a member of the EU and 
the other without being a member, according to Brexit context. There is evidence of positive effects 
on foreign trade and on the welfare level in Brazil, with emphasis on manufactured goods and the 
grains of crops. The EU consolidates its presence in global trade. The results show that Mercosur 
benefits Brazilian foreign trade, making it a strategic partner at the regional level. It is concluded 
that Brexit can reduce Brazilian gains in the EU-Mercosur agreement, being important the 
discussion about the creation of another agreement involving the United Kingdom. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After almost 20 years, Mercosur concludes negotiations on a specific 
agreement with the European Union (EU) (Gortari, 2019; Wang, Liu, Lv, & Zhao, 
2019). The agreement is signed at a time adverse to international liberalization 
policies. Major trading partners renegotiate agreements or adopt protectionist 
policies, such as the US-proposed NAFTA reform debate, the trade war with 
China, and Brexit in the EU. The trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur 
reveals challenges in the formulation of Brazilian trade policy. From an export 
standpoint, the main tendency is to stimulate the agro-export sector, as Brazil is 
currently the second-largest exporter of agricultural products for Europe (SECEX, 
2020). This agreement must also spread knowledge and technologies, creating 
innovation and an increase in productivity (Choi, 2019). 
This paper aims to evaluate the impact of the EU-Mercosur Agreement on 
the Brazilian economy using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) as a 
general equilibrium model (Booth et. al., 2015; Kawasaki, 2017; Belke & Gross, 
2017). The Mercosur countries integration allowed a substantial increase in the 
trade flows but restricting the expansion of Brazilian trade policy as an example, 
bilateral agreements. Recent Brexit negotiations raise doubts about the effects of 
the agreement for Latin America countries. The United Kingdom has the potential 
to increase the size of the European market and exiting the country from the bloc 
can generate considerable trade distortions. 
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There is a market potential in the trade relationship between Mercosur and 
the EU that can contribute to the liberalization of Brazilian economy. Currently, 
the South American market is highly protected, and this agreement can be an 
opportunity to increase competitiveness at a global level. The specific agreement 
provides for the removal of tariffs in Mercosur, such as 35% on cars, 14 - 18% on 
car parts, 18% on chemical products, 14% for pharmaceutical products. In the 
general commercial framework, most of the products exported by Mercosur to the 
EU are from agriculture, such as soy, soy oil and coffee. In turn, most of the 
products exported by the EU to Mercosur are from the Petrochemical and 
Medicines industry. Brazil has an important destination in European countries for 
national manufacturing production (COMEXSTAT, 2019). Of all trade between 
Europe and Mercosur, more than 70% is related to Brazilian participation. 
In this study, we simulate the liberalization policy with the reduction in 
tariff power for all tradable goods. This scenario design implies that the potential 
gains in competitiveness of the Brazilian economy are dependent on the current 
tariff structure, that is, the reduction is proportional and industry-specific, so that 
the positive effects depend on the input-output structure of the entire 
international production system. In this way, we were able to have a clearer view 
on the need for specific sectorial adjustments that would allow the Brazilian 
economy to benefit in terms of a closer link with global markets, since historically 
the country’s commercial and industrial policy was considered closed and 
oriented to the large domestic market. We can summarize our contributions in 
three main aspects: firstly, it generates evidence to guide the debate on 
protectionism and multilateralism at the detailed level of sectors, allowing for 
long-term analysis; second, we consider the feedback effects when analyzing trade 
links with national economies with GTAP model, and; third, we verify the 
geographical reorientation of trade flows between Mercosur and the EU within 
Brexit. The economic effects for Brazil, in terms of bilateral trade gains, welfare 
level and redefinition of the main trading partners contribute to the orientation on 
the most efficient trade policy for the country. 
This article is structured in 5 sections. The second summarizes the main 
trade characteristics between Mercosur and the European Union. The third details 
the model and the simulations applied. Section 4 presents the results and the last 
the final considerations. 
  
2. Potential gains for Brazil from the EU-Mercosur agreement 
 
The relations that already exist between both economic blocs can verify the 
extent of the effects expected by the agreement between Mercosur and the 
European Union. Together, Mercosur and the European Union represent about 
25% of GDP of the world economy and a consumer market of 773 million people. 
The EU is Mercosur’s 2nd largest trading partner, after China, and Mercosur is the 
EU’s 8th largest extra-regional partner.  
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Within Mercosur, since its foundation, intra-regional trade has multiplied 
over 12 times, from US$4.5 billion in 1991 to a peak of US$57 billion in 2013. In 
2019, data up to July show growth of 22.1% in Brazilian exports (US$13 billion) and 
53% in Brazil’s trade balance with the bloc (US$5.9 billion) compared to the same 
period in 2016 (MERCOSUR, 2019). The bloc also stands out for being the main 
recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the Latin America continent: 46% 
of the total for 2016 and 65% of the total for South America in the same year 
(UNCTAD, 2020). There was also an increase in the percentage participation of the 
bloc as a destination for foreign investments in the world: in the pre-crisis years 
(2005-2007), MERCOSUR received 2% of world investment; in 2015, it received 
4.4%; and, in 2016, 3.7%. In 2018, 89% of the flows from Brazil to the other countries 
in the bloc were industrialized products. The growth of exports of these goods in 
relation to 2020 is 28.3%, almost triple the 10.4% registered in the total of Brazil in 
the same period.  
The importance for Brazil of the EU-Mercosur agreement is verified by the 
intense trade with Europe. In 2018, the country recorded a trade of US$76 billion, 
with a surplus of US$7 billion, of which US$42 billion is for exports to the EU, 
representing 18% of total Brazilian exports. In addition, the EU is the largest 
foreign investor in Mercosur, with Brazil being the largest destination for Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in the EU countries in Latin America, corresponding to the 
4th largest non-EU FDI destination. In 2017, the EU injected US$433 billion in 
investments into Mercosur.  
In relation to Brexit, there are risks worldwide because customs rules are 
changed, and potential opportunities because it allows new market spaces to be 
opened. In relation to Brazil, there is potential for the agricultural area, in which 
the country is competitive. The Brexit transition period can be an opportunity to 
expand the dialogue and start negotiations for new trade agreements in various 
sectors. According to Figure 1, among Brazilian exports to Europe, on average, 8% 
were destined for the UK. The UK imports about 50% of what it consumes in food 
and beverages, of which 60% are of European origin. If Brexit is to guide the 
reduction of trade flows between the EU and the UK, countries like Brazil may 
benefit from an eventual redirection of the origin of these imports. In 2018, about 
4% of the food consumed in the United Kingdom was of South American origin. 
The challenges of the European context can position Brazil in becoming 
competitive in sectors other than the primary ones. It is interesting to note that 
most exports are manufactured products. The EU-Mercosur agreement provides 
for the reduction of tariffs for this type of good, which may increase Brazilian (and 
Mercosur's) competitiveness due to the increase in the flow of manufactured goods 
to the European continent. 
The agreement will gradually remove customs tariffs for 92% of goods 
exported by Mercosur to the EU and 91% of products exported from the EU to 
Mercosur. Import and export tariffs should be zero within ten years, and the rest 
of exports will have preferential access through exclusive quotas and partial tariff 
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reductions. Only 24% of Brazilian exports enter the European market free of tax 
obstacles.  
 
Figure 1. Brazilian exports to Europe (lines) and UK’s share (bars). 
 
Source: COMEXSTAT (2020). 
 
Although it offers significant economic benefits, the agreement does, 
however, provide for the promotion by countries of high standards in terms of 
sustainable development and protection of human rights. Both blocs committed 
themselves to implementing the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. According 
to the Paris Agreement, Brazil should reduce, by 2025, the emission of greenhouse 
gas by 37%, compared to the 2005 indexes, reforest 12 million hectares of the 
Amazon forest by 2030, and the EU should reduce domestic emissions by 40% by 
2030. Regarding the protection of workers’ rights, there is a ban on forced or child 
labor, non-discrimination in the work environment, freedom of association and the 
right to collective bargaining, and protecting human rights and indigenous 
communities. 
 
3. Methods and data  
 
3.1 Setting GTAP Model  
 
To evaluate the impact of changes in multilateral policy on the Brazilian 
economy, we adopted the General and Computable Equilibrium (CGE) model 
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Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) version 9. GTAP integrates a series of 
equations that provide a complete description of economic functioning: (i) the 
national standard income and expenditure accounts; (ii) the breakdown of the 
industry by sector, which reflects inter-sector relations (intermediate products 
and services of domestic or foreign origin); (iii) a production function for each 
sector that determines the amount of capital, qualified and unskilled labor and 
intermediate inputs needed to produce; (iv) trade balance that models 
international calls for each sector of the economy (Booth et al, 2015). In this study, 
the model is calibrated for 57 sectors and 8 production factors from input-output 
matrixes from 140 countries for three years - 2004, 2007 and 2011 (Aguiar, 
Narayanan & McDougall, 2016). Our baseline consider eleven regions 
aggregations: 1 - Brazil (BRA); 2 - Argentina (ARG); 3 - Uruguay (URU); 4 - 
Paraguay (PAR); 5 - EU (EU); 6 – United Kingdom (GRB); 7 - United States (USA); 
8 - China (CHI); 9 - Andean Community (DAC)1; 10 - Rest of Latin America 
(RAL); 11 - Rest of the world (ROW).  
British citizens no longer belong to the European Union as of February 1, 
2020, moving on to the transition period to regulate relations between the UK 
and the EU. During this new phase of negotiations, UK will have to follow the 
rules of the bloc - to remain within the European common market – but will not 
have a voice in the European Parliament or any other EU institution. Thus, the 
second scenario - which excludes the United Kingdom (GRB2) from the European 
Union, the model now has twelve regions (the same above plus GRB). Regarding 
the sectors, we consider the nine activities included in the GTAP model.  
 
3.2 GTAP scenarios 
 
We are interested in analyzing the effects of the EU-Mercosur agreement 
on foreign trade and the level of well-being in Brazil. The modeling of the EU-
Mercosur agreement has the initial shock of changing tariff barriers, which 
influence the level of prices and competitiveness in international trade. The shock 
calculation is implemented as the power of the tax, that is, 1 + tax rate (this has 
the advantage of allowing additional price-binding equations when the model is 
fully differentiated) (Corong, Hertel, McDougall, Tsigas, & van der 
Mensbrugghe, 2017). Two scenarios were simulated with changes in customs 
tariffs for a set of goods traded between both regions, and in one situation we 
assume that the UK is part of the EU, and that in the second scenario it is an 
independent region, as in Table 1. 
 
 
1 Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. 
2 The GTAP nomenclature for United Kingdom. In this paper we will use GRB or UK to describe 
the country. 
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a) Scenario 1: The first simulation represents the formalization of a trade 
agreement between Mercosur and the EU. In this scenario, we assume that 
the United Kingdom (GRB) is still an EU-member. It is proposed to reduce 
the Mercosur import tariffs to EU countries in 75% for tradable goods, and 
the equivalent change to Mercosur countries by the EU. 
 
b) Scenario 2: The second scenario reflects the Brexit from the EU. In this case 
the UK is considered by Mercosur as a third country, non-EU and without 
bilateral agreements. The EU countries apply as same tariff as to non-
European (non-EU) to UK and vice versa. 
 
The proposed alternative scenarios are sector-specific and consider the 
current existing Mercosur tariffs that will be removed (European Union, 2019). 
Current rates are 35% for cars, 14 - 18% for car parts, 18% for chemicals, 14% for 
pharmaceuticals. The agricultural sector is the main market of Mercosur for the 
EU. Both scenarios foresee a 75% reduction in charged tariffs and the expected 
results are relative competitiveness gains for the Mercosur countries.  
 
Table 1. Scenarios simulated 
Scenarios Exogeneous shock Origin Destination Industry Change (%) 
1 
tms 
(power of the tax 
on imports) 
EU1 
BRA 
ARG 
URU 
PAR 
Traded 
Commodities 
(TC) 
-75% 
BRA 
ARG 
URU 
PAR 
EU 
Traded 
Commodities 
(TC) 
-75% 
2 
tms 
(power of the tax 
on imports) 
EU 
BRA 
ARG 
URU 
PAR 
Traded 
Commodities 
(TC) 
-75% 
BRA 
ARG 
URU 
PAR 
EU 
Traded 
Commodities 
(TC) 
-75% 
TFRV 
(ordinary import 
duty) 
GRB EU All industries Same of GRB to ROW 
EU GRB All industries Same of EU to ROW 
RTMS 
(target the sector-
level tariffs) 
GRB EU All industries Same of GRB to ROW 
EU GRB All industries Same of EU to ROW 
Note: 1 – In this aggregation setting, GRB is part of European Union. 
 
Under the EU-Mercosur agreement, it is foreseen that 92% of imports from 
Mercosur will enter tariff-free in the EU. Similarly, 91% of imports from the EU 
will enter tariff-free in Mercosur. Tariffs will be partially removed for the EU in 
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baskets of 0, 4, 7 and 10 years and for Mercosur in baskets of 0, 4, 8, 10 and 15 
years, justifying the 75% shock. Under the treaty, products such as meat, sugar, 
ethanol, rice, honey, and corn will have entry quotas (maximum values) into 
Europe. In the industrial sector, Europe will release 100% of its tariffs in 10 years 
and Mercosur will liberalize 91% of volume trade and tariff lines, and the 
scenario will consider the value of 75% (as in the scenario 1). 
In addition to the shocks related to the EU-MERCOSUR trade agreement, 
the second scenario it is assumed that the United Kingdom (GRB) partially 
follows the trade agreements in force by the EU (soft Brexit). The start of the UK’s 
negotiations with the other countries depends, ultimately, on the country's 
established agreements with the EU. Respecting the transitional and indefinite 
period of trade rules between the EU and UK, we assume an intermediate 
situation between “Brexit without agreement” (hard Brexit) and the complete 
maintenance of the agreements in force in the European Union with the other 
countries. In this sense, we consider that two tariff sets – for import (RTMS) and 
TRFV (Ordinary Import Duty) - adopted by both of these regional aggregations 
to the Rest of the World (ROW) are identical to those applied to bilateral trade 
flows between the United Kingdom (GRB) and the EU. When creating the 
regional aggregation3 unique to GRB region, GTAP proportionally recalculated 
the other corresponding parameters and tariffs. 
  
3.3 Behavioral parameters and effects 
 
The intensity of the effects calculated by the model depends on the 
behavioral parameters and the relationship between the variables in the model 
equations, which influence the formation of domestic prices and those practiced 
in international trade. In GTAP, there is allow for imperfect substitution in the 
presence of multiple economic activities, in which case these commodity prices 
are differentiated by activity industry, with differentiation governed by a 
substitution elasticity. The structure assumes CES production function and 
Armington substitution elasticity between goods by different origins. The effect 
size in response to exogenous shock depends on the behavioral parameters of the 
CGE. Table 2 shows the main GTAP substitution parameters. The first three 
columns show the CES coefficient between primary factors in production 
(ESUBVA), the Armington CES for domestic and imported allocation (ESUBD) 
and the Armington CES for regional allocation of imports (ESUBM). The 
remaining columns show the CDE (constant difference of elasticities) 
substitution parameters for each regional aggregation. Scenarios are built based 
on nationalist trade policies promoted by different countries as a reflection of 
changes in the world economic integration dynamics.  
 
3  GTAPAgg software was used. 
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Table 2. Behavioral parameters on GTAP model 
Industries ESUBVA ESUBD ESUBM 
CDE (constant difference of elasticities) substitution parameters 
BRA ARG URU PAR EUA CHI RAL EU CAD GRB ROW 
1 GrainsCrops 0,3 2,6 5,1 1,0 1,0 1,0 0,9 1,0 0,8 0,9 1,0 0,9 1,0 0,9 
2 MeatLstk 0,5 3,1 7,4 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,8 0,2 0,7 0,7 0,4 0,7 0,3 0,6 
3 Extraction 0,2 4,9 11,4 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,2 0,7 0,6 0,3 0,7 0,3 0,7 
4 ProcFood 1,1 2,2 4,5 0,7 0,6 0,6 0,8 0,3 0,8 0,7 0,4 0,8 0,4 0,6 
5 TextWapp 1,3 3,7 7,5 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,8 0,2 0,7 0,7 0,3 0,7 0,3 0,6 
6 
Manufaturado 
1,3 3,4 7,1 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,2 0,6 0,5 0,2 0,6 0,2 0,4 
7 Util_Cons 1,4 2,1 4,7 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,6 0,1 0,6 0,5 0,2 0,5 0,2 0,4 
8 TransComm 1,6 1,9 3,8 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,6 0,1 0,5 0,5 0,2 0,5 0,2 0,3 
9 OthServices 1,3 1,9 3,8 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,6 0,2 0,5 0,5 0,2 0,5 0,2 0,3 
Total 9,9 25,8 55,0 5,1 5,0 5,0 6,2 2,5 5,8 5,5 3,1 5,9 3,0 4,7 
Source: GTAP model. 
 
The specific basic price of the goods and the activity is equal to the 
supplier’s price plus a specific ratio between tax and subsidy for the goods and 
the activity. Domestic supplies are allocated to the destination regions - the 
domestic market and all foreign destinations according to bilateral exports. 
Export prices are obtained by multiplying domestic prices with the export tax 
rate. This converts the price of the domestic offer into the price of exports, 
observing the price before freight and insurance are added. Given a (potentially) 
bilaterally variable export tax, that price is now destination specific. The free on 
board (FOB) price goes through two additional transformations in route to its 
final destination: (i) a shipping margin is added to the FOB price to generate the 
CIF price for imports; (ii) a bilateral tariff (TMS) is added to the latter to generate 
the price of imports in the domestic market by origin.  
In this exercise, the simulated liberalization policy affects the exogenous 
variable 𝑡𝑚𝑠(𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠), which represents the percentage change in the power of the 
import tax of industry 𝑖, from region 𝑟 (source) to region 𝑠 (destination) (Hertel 
& Tsigas, 1997). Both scenarios considered that all tradable goods 
(ALL_TRAD_COMM) sourced in EU and destined for Mercosur are also affected 
with a 75% reduction in the power of the tax. This tends to affect the set of 
economies’ prices, implying decisions made by agents between purchasing 
goods produced domestically or abroad. In the simulations, all tradable goods 
goods produced in the Mercosur countries now have a reduction in the import 
tariff for purchases made by the EU, encouraging direct trade between these 
regions4. In a simplified way, the domestic price linkage equation (which 
 
4 The actual percentage change in power is calculated by 
𝑡𝑚𝑠1−𝑡𝑚𝑠0𝑡𝑚𝑠0 , where the initial 𝑡𝑚𝑠 rate in 
given by GTAP 9 database. In this case, the simulations were for tradable goods originating in 
EU countries destined for countries in the Mercosur with a 75% reduction in 𝑡𝑚𝑠 compared to 
the baseline in the GTAP 9 database, and vice versa. 
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associates domestic prices with global prices) for the industry 𝑖, region of origin 
and destination, can be written as: 
 𝑝𝑚𝑠 (𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠)  =  𝑡𝑚 (𝑖, 𝑠)  +  𝑡𝑚𝑠 (𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠)  +  𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑓 (𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠) (1) 
 
Shocks applied to 𝑡𝑚𝑠 generate effects on the level of prices in trade 
between the different regional aggregations of the system. The model assumes 
that the general source of import tax (𝑡𝑚) is exogenous, since countries do not 
impose a higher tariff on traded goods provided by other countries. However, 
the size of the effect on 𝑝𝑚𝑠 depends on the global CIF price level of the tradable 
commodity 𝑖 that is imported from origin 𝑟 to destination 𝑠, after the inclusion of 
transport margins, 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠). In specific: 
 𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑓 (𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠)  =  𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑆𝐻𝑅 (𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠) . 𝑝𝑓𝑜𝑏 (𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠)  +  𝑇𝑅𝑁𝑆𝐻𝑅 (𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠) . 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 (𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠) (2) 
 
The changing in tariffs on imports (𝑡𝑚𝑠) generates changes in the level of 
import prices (𝑝𝑚𝑠(𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠) and 𝑝𝑖𝑚(𝑖, 𝑠)). The decision of domestic agents 
between purchasing imported products or offered nationally will reflect on the 
level of domestic prices. The interdependence of the model implies that the CIF 
world price of imports also changes, however, in a smaller proportion than the 
power of import taxes, 𝑡𝑚𝑠. The relationship between FOB and CIF prices for 
each industry 𝑖 considers the share of FOB price and transport in imports. FOB 
costs tend to vary in the same direction as the variation in the CIF price, which 
may be related to the variation in domestic prices. This dynamic implies changes 
in the demand for exports (from 𝑟 to 𝑠): 
 𝑞𝑥𝑠 (𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠)  =  𝑞𝑖𝑚 (𝑖, 𝑠)  − 𝐸𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑀 (𝑖). [𝑝𝑚𝑠 (𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠) −  𝑝𝑖𝑚 (𝑖, 𝑠)] 
 
(3) 
where ESUBM is the region-generic elasticity of substitution between imported 
and domestic goods 𝑖 (according to Table 2), 𝑞𝑖𝑚(𝑖, 𝑠) is the aggregate imports of 𝑖 in region 𝑠, and 𝑝𝑖𝑚(𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠) is the price market value of aggregated imports of 
tradable commodities 𝑖 in the region 𝑠. The model considers that the prices of 
aggregate imports are related to the technical coefficient and the domestic price 
level: 
 𝑝𝑖𝑚 (𝑖, 𝑠)  =  ∑ (𝑘, 𝑅𝐸𝐺, 𝑀𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑆 (𝑖, 𝑘, 𝑠). [𝑝𝑚𝑠 (𝑖, 𝑘, 𝑠)  − 𝑎𝑚𝑠 (𝑖, 𝑘, 𝑠)] (4) 
 
where 𝑀𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑆 (𝑖, 𝑘, 𝑠) is the market share of the source s in aggregate imports of 
tradable commodities i in the regions valued at market prices. The variation in 
import preference implies changes in the effect on export sales (𝑞𝑥𝑠), however, 
given that the variation in 𝑝𝑖𝑚 (𝑖, 𝑠) is assessed as share, the magnitude of the 
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variation in the aggregate import price depends on the level of change in import 
preference. 
A national importer aggregates bilateral imports from all sources to 
‘produce’ an aggregate import package at a price of imported supplies. Every 
economic agent - companies, families, government, and investments - accesses 
this common market for import packages at a common price that competes with 
goods supplied domestically with domestic prices. Bearing this in mind, the next 
section presents the main results for the Brazilian economy in relation to foreign 
trade and welfare level. 
 
4. The EU-Mercosur simulations results 
 
In this section, we present the main results of the simulations. Initially, we 
analyzed the impacts on foreign trade of regional and sectoral aggregates we 
considered in the study. Following, we highlight the effects on the Brazilian 
economy based on the structure of the GTAP model. From the GTAP model, we 
can evaluate a set of possible strategies for Brazilian trade policy. The global GCE 
models allow us to capture cross-sectoral linkages between countries, generating 
feedback effects that enable increased welfare levels. Empirical evidence from 
models applied to trade liberalization analysis tends to yield results that show a 
reduction in regional inequality in developing regions (Haddad & Azzoni, 2017). 
According to the competitive advantages of countries, liberalization tends to favor 
specialization. In this sense, for Mercosur members, the relevant role of the 
primary sectors for the trade balance is crucial for promoting competitiveness and 
for variations in international price levels.  
The model theoretical mechanisms assume that the demand stimulus 
generated by fluctuations in intermediate prices tends to generate positive effects 
for the trade balance in the region. Table 3 shows the expected percentage change 
in value of exports of tradable commodity 𝑖 from source region 𝑟 using fob 
weights (is a linearized form of exports). In the first scenario, we simulate the EU-
Mercosur agreement without Brexit. It is important to note that agricultural 
products are of strategic interest to the Brazilian economy, and that the agreement 
promotes the reduction of tariffs on key products, such as orange juice, fruits, 
soluble coffee, fish, crustaceans, and vegetable oils. Brazilian exporters of beef, 
pork and poultry, sugar, ethanol, rice, eggs, and honey will have preferential 
access to the European consumer market. 
 
Table 3. Changes on value of merchandise regional exports, by commodity 
(vxwfob) 
 
Industry BRA ARG URU PAR EUA CHI RAL EU CAD ROW GRB 
W
it
h
o
u
t 
B
re
x
it
 GrainsCrops 7.00 6.75 -  5.40 7.78 10.46 10.17 10.06 10.20 9.84 10.15 - 
MeatLstk 54.83 166.98 97.67 36.27 10.86 6.63 8.96 -   1.78 7.32 7.95 - 
Extraction 9.48 12.04 5.67 1.52 10.04 10.05 9.99 9.80 9.99 9.98 - 
ProcFood 19.78 5.74 -  5.17 14.48 10.19 9.92 10.09 9.64 9.98 9.92 - 
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Industry BRA ARG URU PAR EUA CHI RAL EU CAD ROW GRB 
TextWapp 7.19 5.47 -15.20 1.21 10.07 9.94 9.97 10.76 9.75 9.99 - 
Manufactury 6.74 3.30 -  5.83 2.17 9.92 9.96 9.81 10.59 9.76 9.92 - 
Util_Cons 7.02 6.94 -  5.21 8.18 10.20 10.21 10.25 9.84 10.29 10.14 - 
TransComm 7.92 5.79 2.19 8.31 10.21 10.16 10.19 9.99 10.26 10.12 - 
OthServices 6.94 5.28 -  4.33 7.10 10.27 10.23 10.26 9.88 10.33 10.18 - 
W
it
h
 B
re
x
it
 
GrainsCrops 7.53 6.63 -  3.28 7.77 10.42 10.17 10.07 10.19 9.87 10.14 9.55 
MeatLstk 47.81 164.66 84.52 35.08 10.76 6.79 9.23 1.41 7.02 8.41 -   3.68 
Extraction 9.62 11.93 4.36 1.79 10.02 10.03 9.99 9.79 9.99 9.98 9.99 
ProcFood 18.79 5.75 -  2.71 14.25 10.21 9.94 10.11 9.67 10.00 9.95 9.42 
TextWapp 7.89 5.17 -11.96 1.37 10.06 9.94 9.97 10.76 9.75 9.99 10.12 
Manufactury 7.29 3.51 -  3.50 2.45 9.93 9.96 9.82 10.58 9.79 9.93 10.02 
Util_Cons 7.59 6.77 -  2.86 8.14 10.20 10.21 10.25 9.83 10.29 10.15 10.15 
TransComm 8.28 5.80 3.38 8.32 10.19 10.15 10.18 9.97 10.24 10.11 10.12 
OthServices 7.44 5.28 -  2.17 7.11 10.24 10.20 10.23 9.84 10.30 10.15 10.15 
Source: Own elaboration, based on GTAP results. 
 
The main sectors benefited by the liberalization policy in Brazil are meat 
and processed foods. It is interesting to note that other Mercosur countries are 
also benefited, despite Brazil benefiting from greater increases in all industries, 
apart from meat, in which Argentina dominates in terms of increased exports. In 
comparison to the second scenario, it is interesting to note that gains for Mercosur 
are relatively lower than in the first scenario, indicating that the UK as an isolated 
region has the potential to capture part of the international demand in these 
sectors. The EU will open itself only to agricultural products from Mercosur that 
have administered quotas, to reduce possible negative impacts on the local 
subsistence agriculture. In the agri-food sector, the agreement provides for the 
elimination of customs tariffs for exports of EU products in Mercosur, such as 
chocolates (currently taxed at 20%), wines, non-alcoholic beverages and dairy 
products, including cheeses. The effect on meat exports is increasing and 
dominate other sectors. 
When comparing Scenario 1 with Scenario 2, we observe that the exclusion 
of the UK from EU generates relative losses only for the manufactured sector in 
Brazil. In other words, there is a smaller increase in Brazilian exports, except for 
Manufacturing. Regardless of Brexit, Brazilian companies benefit from the 
elimination of tariffs on the industrial products exports, which contributes to 
equalizing conditions of competition with other partners that already have free 
trade agreements with the EU. The second scenario illustrates the trade strategy 
recommended by the World Trade Organization (WTO), with UK imposing 
tariffs on imports from all countries, including other EU members. Exporters 
from developing countries would face specific rates, as would countries in the 
EU. 
In the context of the agreement between EU-Mercosur, the reflexes of 
Brexit for the Brazil – UK trade relationship are, according to our simulations, 
initially small. We assume that the United Kingdom’s recent exit from the EU, 
with the maintenance of parameters from the GTAP database except for import 
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tariffs (TRFV and TSMS). If the EU and the UK do not reach a broad agreement 
by the end of 2020 or if there is no extension of the transition period, both regions 
will now negotiate under WTO terms, meaning both sides will be subject to 
customs tariffs, which it applies both to British products imported into the EU 
and to products which go the other way. This type of situation is expected to be 
detrimental to both sides, even more so for the UK, which is more dependent on 
the EU than the other way around. 
Scenario 2 assumes that third countries would maintain their current 
tariffs and would not retaliate against increasing export tariffs to the UK. For the 
other Mercosur countries (Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay), the situation in 
which England is part of the EU generates greater effects in terms of exported 
quantity. On the other hand, in proportion to the variations in exports, England 
benefits more than the European Union in trade in all sectors, apart from Meat 
industry. On the importation side, the EU-Mercosur agreement generates an 
increase in world trade. The Brazilian economy is affected by the large increase 
in the entry of foreign-made textile and manufactured products, which has 
adverse effects on the domestic industry, as shown in Figure 2. These results 
indicate the trade opening of the Brazilian economy and the country’s greater 
presence in international negotiations. 
 
Figure 2. value of merchandise regional imports, by commodity, CIF (viwcif) 
 
Source: Own elaboration, based on GTAP results. 
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Comparing the scenarios with and without Brexit, it is interesting to note 
the dynamics of the variation in the prices of aggregate exports from Brazil 
(Figure 3). Brazil’s pattern of comparative advantages over the EU’s productive 
sectors is revealed. Export prices for Brazilian products are relatively lower in 
Brexit. Despite maintaining a certain proportional pattern, it is interesting to 
observe the sectoral heterogeneity. This variation in prices determines the 
increase in exports of Brazilian products.  
 
Figure 3. Aggregate exports price index of each industry from region Brazil (pxw) 
 
Source: Own elaboration, based on GTAP results. 
 
Table 4 shows the effects on price and quantity levels for Brazil, the EU, 
and the UK. The first rows represent the goods supplied by Brazil destined to 
European market. The shock in the power of tariffs, 𝑡𝑚𝑠 (𝑖, 𝐵𝑅𝐴, 𝐸𝑈), results in a 
reduction in the import price in some important sectors for the Brazilian 
economy, such as Livestock and Meat Products (MEATLSTK) and Processed 
foods (TEXTWAPP). This reduction is accompanied by relative increases in other 
price levels. It is important to consider that the term 𝑝𝑚𝑠 depends on the CIF 
price level, 𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑓(𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠), and these, in turn, are related to the FOB price level, 𝑝𝑓𝑜𝑏(𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠). We note that international price levels restrict further reduction in 𝑝𝑚𝑠, and there is an increase with different intensities between industries. The 
price of total imports from Brazil, 𝑝𝑖𝑚 (𝑖, 𝐵𝑅𝐴), increases with different 
intensities between the different sectorial aggregations since they depend on 𝑝𝑚𝑠. The smallest increases are for the prices of imports of manufactured, 
processed foods and Textiles and Clothing (TEXTWAPP), which encourages 
trade in these sectors destined for the EU market. The result of the variation in 
the price level is seen in the variations in the demand for imports from the EU for 
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goods supplied by Brazil, 𝑞𝑥𝑠(𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑠). There is a clear increase in European 
demand for the Livestock and Meat Products, Processed Food and Textiles and 
Clothing sectors, followed by minor increases in manufactured goods. In relative 
terms, there is a reduction in European demand in other sectors. Thus, according 
to the simulations, we note that the Livestock and Meat Products and Processed 
Foods industries would be the main beneficiaries of the trade agreement on the 
Brazilian side. On the European view, there is a greater flow destined to Brazil, 
with clear effects of liberalization. Aggregate imports from Brazil increase for all 
industries, except for Mining and Extraction industry. Aggregate imports from 
the EU increase in all sectors, indicating an increase in international trade links. 
The second scenario assumes changes in tariffs between UK and other 
parts of the world, including EU countries. We note in Table 4 that the shock in 𝑡𝑚𝑠 generates a reduction in aggregate imports in the UK in all industries, at the 
same time as there is an increase in exports to Brazil. In the context of the applied 
simulations, the results show that the UK would open its economy and that Brazil 
could be a potential destination for part of British production. At the same time, 
it can be seen that the aggregate imports from the UK show a small reduction in 
all sectors, most likely due to the increased demand for domestic goods, given 
the new tariff structure in force in the country. 
 
Table 4. Effects on prices and quantities in BRA, EU and GRB 
Variable GrainsCrops MeatLstk Extraction ProcFood TextWapp Manufacturing Util_Cons TransComm OthServices 
Scenario 1 
pfob[i.BRA.EU] 11.43 11.64 9.99 11.10 10.65 10.41 10.92 11.03 11.08 
pcif[i.BRA.EU] 11.28 11.55 9.99 11.02 10.62 10.39 10.92 11.03 11.08 
pms[i.BRA.EU] 10.10 -11.87 9.98 -1.44 6.29 9.69 10.92 11.03 11.08 
pm[i.BRA] 11.43 11.64 9.99 11.10 10.65 10.41 10.92 11.03 11.08 
pim[i.BRA] 11.06 11.43 9.91 7.73 7.75 7.48 10.11 9.99 9.99 
qim[i.BRA] 1.82 1.51 -1.27 7.05 8.00 7.31 2.69 1.81 1.66 
qxs[i.BRA.EU] -1.89 318.74 -0.15 61.43 28.81 2.05 -3.77 -3.44 -3.56 
pfob[i.EU.BRA] 9.69 9.59 9.98 9.92 10.01 10.02 10.03 10.02 10.05 
pcif[i.EU.BRA] 9.73 9.61 9.98 9.93 10.01 10.02 10.03 10.02 10.05 
pms[i.EU.BRA] 3.16 4.69 8.21 -0.43 -6.03 1.68 10.03 10.02 10.05 
pm[i.EU] 9.69 9.59 9.98 9.92 10.01 10.02 10.03 10.02 10.05 
pim[i.EU] 9.80 6.16 9.95 9.62 9.96 9.98 9.99 9.99 10.00 
qim[i.EU] -0.49 7.78 0.22 0.27 0.19 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.09 
qxs[i.EU.BRA] 47.96 60.42 17.94 52.24 197.75 58.59 3.02 1.68 1.46 
Scenario 2 
pfob[i.GRB.BRA] 9.80 9.78 9.96 9.94 9.95 9.96 9.95 9.95 9.95 
pcif[i.GRB.BRA] 9.81 9.79 9.96 9.94 9.95 9.96 9.95 9.95 9.95 
pms[i.GRB.BRA] 9.81 9.79 9.96 9.94 9.95 9.96 9.95 9.95 9.95 
pm[i.GRB] 9.80 9.78 9.96 9.94 9.95 9.96 9.95 9.95 9.95 
pim[i.GRB] 9.96 9.87 9.95 9.98 9.96 9.99 9.99 9.99 10.00 
qim[i.GRB] -0.27 -0.23 0.01 -0.10 -0.03 -0.07 -0.14 -0.07 -0.08 
qxs[i.GRB.BRA] 7.03 11.48 -1.57 -1.76 -7.00 -8.03 2.96 1.64 1.52 
 
 
Table 5 shows the effects of the EU-Mercosur agreement on well-being and 
GDP growth under different Brexit configurations. According to Roy & Mathur 
(2016), foreign trade theory shows that the net impact on the well-being of any 
regional trade agreement depends on the relative sizes of the effects of trade 
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creation and diversion. Trade creation arises when imported products produced 
more efficiently replace domestic products produced in a relatively inefficient 
manner, thus increasing the import demand because of the lower import prices 
of the partner country. Trade diversion occurs when sources of supply shift from 
more efficient producing third countries to less efficient producing member 
countries under tariff-free access granted to signatory countries.  
 
Table 5. Equivalent variation (US$) million and change in value of GDP (%). 
Region 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
EV vgdp EV vgdp 
BRA 3361.23 10.96 2783.88 10.78 
ARG 1872.55 11.77 1866.71 11.77 
URU 883.38 16.66 740.68 15.57 
PAR 78.68 11.09 78.09 11.1 
EUA -1350.35 9.89 -1221.15 9.9 
CHI -1402.10 9.89 -1223.78 9.9 
RAL -473.51 9.89 -427.3 9.9 
EU 7525.42 10.05 7034.12 10.06 
CAD -154.38 9.87 -143.5 9.89 
GRB   -2540.04 9.93 
ROW -2842.82 9.92 -302.18 9.94 
Source: Own elaboration, based on GTAP results. 
 
Tariff changes produce welfare gains for both Brazil (and other Mercosur 
countries) and the EU, accompanied by an increase in GDP. When simulating the 
tariff changes, the measure of equivalent variation of these changes in well-being 
is 3361.23 million dollars (US$) for the Brazilian economy and 7525.42 million 
dollars for the EU. Brazil experiences a 10.96% increase in GDP, while the EU 
increases by 10.05%. These results indicate that greater liberalization between the 
trade blocs leads to a greater increase in mutual well-being. The other countries 
that are not signatories to the EU-Mercosur agreement show a decrease in well-
being in the presence of tariff changes.  
The last two columns of Table 5 show the results in the presence of Brexit 
(Scenario 2). In relative terms, both the gain in well-being and the variation in 
Brazilian GDP are lower. The change in the size of the European market, despite 
the maintenance of gains for the Brazilian economy, is less with Brexit. The model 
calculates the monetary metric equivalent of this dollar utility and is referred to 
as an equivalent variation (EV). In GTAP, the behavior of a representative family 
is characterized by a utility function that is governed by private domestic 
consumption, government consumption and the economy. In this way, the 
percentage change in the per capita utility aggregated in a region resulting from 
a simulation of the GTAP model represents the change in the well-being of that 
region, keeping the rest constant. It is important to note that the UK suffers a 
reduction in welfare when import tariffs are changed between the EU and 
Mercosur, despite the gain in terms of GDP. In both scenarios, the Mercosur 
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countries show gains in well-being, showing economic benefits for the bloc of the 
execution of this trade agreement.  
If we compare the different situations in which the UK is not part of the 
EU, we find that, although Brazil benefits from the trade agreement promoted by 
Mercosur, it cannot overcome the loss of welfare from Brexit. It is interesting to 
note that losing well-being for the EU and the UK is mainly because of the 
increase in non-tariff barriers, where even an increase in non-tariff barriers 
results in a greater loss of well-being. A similar implication is also seen regarding 
the growth rates of these economic units. If we consider the case of Mercosur, we 
see that the trade agreement is beneficial for all countries, but not as much as in 
the absence's case of Brexit. These results show that the future discussion on a 
new bilateral agreement between the British country and the South American 
bloc is relevant for both Brazil and the UK. 
 
5. Final remarks 
 
This study assessed the economic impacts of the EU-Mercosur agreement 
on the Brazilian economy. After twenty years of negotiation, the agreement is 
broad and goes beyond tariff aspects, including regulatory issues, such as 
services, government procurement, trade facilitation, technical barriers, sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures and intellectual property. The analysis of the effects 
becomes more complex, however, since the agreement is signed in the middle of 
a rupture process by one party, with the completion of Brexit in 2020. In this 
context, the article simulated two scenarios: in the first, the United Kingdom is 
part of the EU, while in the second scenario it is considered a separate region. We 
simulated a non-extreme Brexit scenario, with changes in import tariffs (RMS and 
TMS), imposing that the same tariffs applied by the UK to the Rest of the World 
(ROW) under the GTAP were now also applied to trade with the EU. The same 
logic was adopted for the opposite direction, for trade between the EU and the 
UK.  
The conclusions have important implications to the Brazilian economy 
and trade policy. The model reveals economic benefits to Mercosur and the EU 
countries. For Mercosur, the agreement with the EU represents the first major 
liberalization action in recent decades. The prevailing scenario was characterized 
by an isolationist trade policy without the signing of relevant agreements, thus 
giving new impetus to the regional bloc which seemed to be dormant in its 
international relations and in the internal political relevance granted by 
governments. The impact on the Latin America economy is considerable, as 
shown by the results. This indicates the importance of increasing Brazilian 
participation in new agreements, as well as encouraging insertion as a bilateral 
trading partner. The results show that Mercosur benefits Brazilian foreign trade, 
making it a strategic partner at the regional level. In addition, the improvement 
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negotiations signed by the Latin American bloc tends to generate 
competitiveness gains and expansion of the export agenda.  
Despite the positive effects for Brazil, it is important that Brazilian policy 
creates mechanisms to encourage local producers, especially in the Grains and 
Crops sectors, to avoid losses in the long run. Some of the competition strategies 
adopted in the global agricultural market indicate that Brazil must also 
emphasize diversifying production with higher value products to access the EU 
and other markets. It is important that Brazilian agricultural policy prioritizes 
investments so that small and medium farmers can increase their 
competitiveness and meet the institutional and market requirements, already 
present and future, that will come from the agreement between MERCOSUR and 
the EU.  
The scenarios considered the same liberalization policy between the 
Mercosur countries and the EU, reflected in different gains for both regions with 
variations in the degree of competitiveness. The general results show that 
European production would be more easily sold to the South American market, 
than the other way around. Brazil would be a net beneficiary of exports from the 
meat and processed foods sector; however, agriculture would require specific 
instruments that would benefit it in the long run. This is since the liberalization 
shocks do not show immediate increases in national competitiveness in relation 
to the Grains and Crops sector, where international competition is a risk to the 
national producer market. 
It is important to note that the mechanisms of effects of GTAP in relation 
to changes in the power of tariffs are proportional, that is, it takes into account 
the baseline, which implies differentiated effects and a greater relative weight of 
the role of international prices (CIF and FOB) in the reduction of import prices 
and relative gains in sectoral competitiveness. Brazil is considered a closed 
country with several protected sectors, with high tariffs on imports. The size of 
the domestic market and the history of industrial policies focused on the large 
domestic market contribute to explain this reality. 
Also is important to note that the results of GTAP simulations showed that 
there are differences in the Brazilian welfare gains and foreign trade when we 
include Brexit. This highlights the importance of Mercosur and the UK also 
starting negotiations for an eventual bilateral agreement, since it has given the 
potential for benefits to Brazil. Negotiating terms advantageous for the UK with 
Mercosur may represent a set of fewer protectionist actions in the agricultural 
area and have more offensive positions on various topics on the international 
trade agenda, such as transgenics and biotechnology. The actual implementation 
of the EU-Mercosur agreement opens space for further advances in agricultural 
guidelines that favor the South American market over the British one. In relation 
to Brexit, it is important to note that the effects are conditioned to the way it was 
implemented in GTAP. By assuming that the tariffs are equal to those practiced 
by RoW, the intensity of the effects becomes broader. However, our results of 
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changes in GDP and in the level of well-being indicate that, with the supposed 
facts, the UK would incur welfare losses, while increasing the demand for 
domestic production and aiming to increase exports to other parts of the world. 
For future studies, it is relevant to include policy actions from other 
countries to generate clear prospects for relative gains from the negotiations. The 
EU-Mercosur agreement provides for the promotion by countries of high 
standards in terms of sustainable development and protection of human rights. In 
this sense, it is relevant for future work to include extensions to the CGE that 
capture the effects on greenhouse gas emissions, land use and environmental 
control. As well, adopting a differentiated tariff for extra-regional countries in the 
EU creates demands for bilateral or multilateral agreements with UK, providing 
an opportunity for Brazil to consolidate itself as a relevant trade partner.  
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